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October 24, 2002

'Just Friends' Continues Its Timeless Debate

'JUST FRIENDS' CONTINUES ITS TIMELESS DEBATE
THE HOYA
SEX ON THE HILLTOP
OCTOBER 25, 2002


Like partisan politics in Washington, mixed gender friendships elicit strong and divergent opinions. Can men and women really be friends? From the casual “Sure, why not?” to the hard-line “HELL no!” and all the hesitant “yes … but” qualifiers in between, one thing is certain – it’s complicated.

While most people do acknowledge the theoretical existence of male-female friendships, almost all agree that in practice such ideal relationships are elusive and difficult to maintain.  At best, they are described as precarious balancing acts, requiring constant vigilance to avoid stepping over the line of romantic-no-return.  At worst they are said to lead either to stalking or, according to one bitter platonic friend, “destruction of the spirit and ego, followed by slow shredding of the heart.”
Avoidance of such emotional devastation seems to be dependent on both members fitting an extremely limited set of criteria. That is to say, a non-sexual gender-diverse friendship MIGHT ACTUALLY OCCUR if:
A)   both parties are unattractive
B)    both are unattractED
C)   both have a significant other “to keep them satisfied”
D)  one or both are gay
E)   one or both are eunuchs
And for the incredibly naïve, if:
F)   one is dating the other’s best friend*
*(F) remains highly questionable, due to overwhelming anecdotal proof in Cosmopolitan (“I Slept with My Best Friend’s Boyfriend – 10 Times! But We’re Just Friends”).

A clear theme should be evident by now – the main obstacle to platonic relationships is… well, my grandfather summed it up best: “‘Can men and women be friends?’ Absolutely! If one can keep sex out of it.”

Ah, sex. Is it always about sex? According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a friend is “a person whom one knows, likes and trusts.” Nowhere in the definition does it say “and with whom one would never have sex.”

And yet, clearly there is a line between the sibling-like love in friendship and the passionate amour of eros.  What does separate platonic and romantic relationships?

The 12 year old in last summer’s About a Boy had a very similar question.  “What’s the difference between a girl who’s a friend and a girl-friend?” he asks Hugh Grant, the older (but no wiser) confirmed bachelor.  Good question, Hugh thinks to himself.  They decide together that it must have something to do with wanting to touch her, to be with her all the time, to tell her things they wouldn’t tell anyone else.  And, they conclude, it also involves not wanting her to have another boyfriend.

In other words, it’s about sex – defined broadly, of course.  Yes, it’s true that wanting to “tell her things they wouldn’t tell anyone else” may not scream “sex!” to the average reader  Still, I would contend that this desire is a clear prerequisite for the intimacy of pillow talk – an intimacy unrivaled by almost any other type of conversation, save that of people trapped in an elevator or roadtrips with non-relatives.  And maybe hostage situations.

Indeed, it is the seemingly innocuous nature of these “borderline” activities that makes platonic relationships so difficult to navigate precisely.  Does wanting to hug him constitute more than a platonic interest?  Probably not.  Wanting to kiss him?  Pretty much, yes.

One male friend of mine (see letters B and F, and sometimes I think D, but he would never admit it) seemed confused about how to draw the line. “I don't understand,” he said. “Does ‘friends’ just mean you don't want to sleep with them?”

Well … it helps.

Webster’s defines platonic friendship as “a pure, spiritual affection, subsisting between persons of opposite sex, unmixed with carnal desires, and regarding the mind only and its excellences.”  Doesn’t leave a lot of room for unmitigated lust, eh?

Sure, there may be other compelling (non-sexual) reasons women and men are less likely to become friends.  “Economic, political, psychological, and other differences between the genders result in the fact that women find it difficult to be friends with men and vice versa,” says Mary Hunt, author of Fierce Tenderness: A Feminist Theology of Friendship.

That having been said, there is no doubt that latent sexual attraction is far and away the greatest impediment to mixed-gender friendships. Even Nietzsche agreed, writing that “Women can enter into a friendship with a man perfectly well; but in order to maintain it the aid of a little physical antipathy is perhaps required.”

In other words, you’d better find the other person physically unpleasant, or your friendship is going the way of J. Lo and Ben Affleck.  One day, you’re “just friends” with a ridiculously good-looking movie star, the next you’re divorcing your husband (there goes letter C) and making out in a convertible Bentley.  It’s a slippery slope.

No question, the level of attraction between two people determines their ability to be friends. But does that mean that good looks and mixed-gender friendship is a zero-sum relationship?  If Nietzsche is right, the answer would be yes – the less attractive one is to one’s friends, the easier it is to maintain that friendship in a non-sexual manner.  Perhaps the question should be rephrased to: “Can one really be friends with someone you’re sexually attracted to?”

One Hoya Senior laid out his thoughts on the issue quite bluntly, “If she’s too ugly, part of you doesn’t want to be friends with her in the first place.  If she’s too hot, you can pretend to be friends but secretly really want to bone like crazy.”

Well, there you have it – friendship and attraction aren’t mutually exclusive after all!  It seems that you can be friends with good-looking people, as long as you keep your “desire to bone” on the down-low.

I was surprised at the number of guys who agreed. One fellow seemed fairly blasé when I asked him whether sex-appeal interfered with companionship. “Nah,” he replied. “Any straight guy will entertain thoughts of sleeping with an attractive woman – that doesn't necessarily affect the friendship.  You just don’t act on the what-ifs.”

While in the library yesterday, I queried a passing freshman about this methodology, fully expecting him to deny that anyone would advocate such an approach. Instead, his eyes lit up with recognition while he nodded vigorously, “Oh sure, that’s normal.  We all do it.”

We do??

I’ll never look at my guy friends in the same way …

It’s clear that 1) these young people haven’t read their dictionary lately (carnal desires + platonic friendship = not platonic friendship) and 2) they don’t fully realize how transparent their “secret” desires – boning or otherwise – can be.

Unfortunately, in circumstances involving emotions as strong and unruly as lust, both women and men are frequently less-than-subtle.  The power of erotic attraction is difficult to conceal – people simply act differently around those they find attractive.  As one senior says, “You think about what you’re saying or doing more than you normally would.  You act like an idiot.”

“But,” he adds, shining a ray of hope in the direction of attracted platonic friends everywhere, “if you stay friends, after a while you become comfortable, and it doesn’t matter anymore.  You’re so close and know so much about the other that you don’t want anything to ruin that.”

Least of all your secret desire to bone, right?

Perhaps there’s hope for male-female friendships after all …

October 04, 2002

Dating with a Lowercase 'd'

DATING WITH A LOWERCASE 'D'
THE HOYA
SEX ON THE HILLTOP
OCTOBER 4, 2002


Recently I asked a few random Hoyas what strategies they used when “dating with a lowercase ‘d.’” I was met with one of three responses:
1)    Blank stare.
2)    Look of confusion / panic.  “uhhh…dating with a lowercase what?”
3)    Short pause. Realization of what concept means.  Realization that phrase to describe concept is brilliant.  Euphoric expression of joy at concept in general.  Desire to start employing concept immediately.
Okay, okay, response #3 only occurred twice.

Clearly there’s a dearth of knowledge about this process. And if students don’t know about it, how can they possibly practice it? As ignorance is a weak reason to miss out on such a valuable non-platonic interaction, let me enlighten you:
Dating with a Lowercase ‘d’: On the relationship spectrum, somewhere between hooking up and monogamous commitment (aka Dating with an uppercase ‘D’); usually entails traditional type “dates” as well as non-exclusive status.

Are we the only university deficient in this type of relationship?  In a completely unscientific poll, I interrogated friends at colleges across the nation, asking: “Do students at your university date with a lowercase ‘d’?”

Wesleyan Friend: Not really. But we have “Come as Your Favorite Contraceptive” parties!

Northwestern (ex-boy)Friend: Um … have you seen the people that go here?

Princeton Friend: Not so much. We’re more of a “sex with a lowercase ‘s’” kind of school.

Johns Hopkins Friend: Date?

One summed up the state of campus dating life by saying: “People are either ‘married’ or they randomly hook up. There’s nothing in between.”

Nothing in between???

I think my mission is clear.  Students are obviously bereft and devoid of options.  We need a revival of the old-fashioned principle of casual dating!  No longer shall your relationship status be “single, faithful, or cheater.”  No longer shall you be boxed into a serious relationship just because you want to have something slightly more meaningful than a drunk hookup! No more shall you be derided as a player when you merely wish to keep your options open!

I’m appealing to all undergraduates here: Take Back the Date!

There are virtually no disadvantages to casual dating. There’s nothing better than making new friends and having new experiences. When else would you walk around the National Christmas tree or see a performance at the Kennedy Center? Oh, sure, you could do those things with your friends. But you couldn’t kiss them afterwards!

It’s also one of the best ways to learn about an unfamiliar subject – want to know about med school? Date a med student. Judaism? Date a member of J-Frat. Lacrosse?  … um … read a book.

Moreover, it’s an effective way to practice interacting with members of the opposite sex (graduates of single sex high schools, I’m talking to you). Keg parties and study groups aren’t necessarily the activities most conducive to perfecting your skills. Dating one-on-one gives you a chance to become comfortable with new people in unfamiliar social situations. Trust me, experience in dating helps.  This, in turn, can boost your confidence and self-esteem.  Today, a date with your hot lab partner.  Tomorrow, a cast member of the Real World …

So why don’t more undergrads date?  Overwhelming fear of a “sober hookup”? Lack of money, perhaps? Please. If you have money to buy a keg, you have money to take a girl out. I believe the answer lies in our culture. As a wise freshman opined, “If you do anything with a guy one-on-one, you’re automatically in an exclusive relationship.” And if you choose to see more than one guy in a weekend? “You’re labeled a slut or a player, depending on your gender.”

No, no, no.  Casually dating multiple people is an excellent way to hedge your bets – it broadens your dating portfolio. As long as both parties realize the relationship is not exclusive, there is nothing underhanded or immoral about Friday night dinner with Mike and Saturday night drinks with John. Obviously, steer clear of detail oriented talks about other suitors – Mike really doesn’t need to know that John has a bigger … dorm room.

So how does one go about dating with a lowercase ‘d’? For guys, the traditional method is to get her digits and call at least three days in advance for the date. The conversation should be light, brief, and concluded with a laid back question like, “So … Do you want to get together for drinks/dinner/coffee/dessert/activity on day-of-week-3-days-from-then?” This formula should get you through even the most nerve-wracking of pre-date calls.

Needless to say, dialing the girl Saturday night at 11 with the message that “Yo, Late Night is at Mike’s place” does not count.  Sorry laxers.

As for the girls, your job is to say “yes.” Unless the boy is violent, insane, or your best friend’s ex-boyfriend, give it a chance.  Do not think about whether you want to Date him with an Uppercase ‘D.’ Do not conclude that he isn’t “your type.” Do not assume this is the beginning of a long term relationship that you’re “not ready for” and even if you were, you certainly wouldn’t have one with a College Republican SFSer.  Actually, that last objection might be a valid one.

The point is this – there is no such thing as bad dating experience.  Experience allows us to discover what we want in a significant other, what we don’t want, and what we’ll run screaming down M Street to avoid.  It gives us interesting stories to tell – there’s nothing better than a good Dating War Story.

And above all, it’s a damn good way to pass the time.

October 01, 2002

Letter to the Editor: University Enforcing Condom Policy Anathema to Students' Free Speech

UNIVERSITY ENFORCING CONDOM POLICY ANATHEMA TO STUDENTS’ FREE SPEECH
THE HOYA
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
OCTOBER 1, 2002

To the Editor:

Continuing to erode what’s left of the academic right to free speech on this campus, Georgetown’s draconian decision to prevent the condom distribution on residence hall doors sets a frightening precedent.

This is the latest in a series of rights-based infringements on the student body under the questionable premise of “protection.”  In other words, the administration has unilaterally decided the course of action and chosen to act without reason or impetus from actual students.  LGTBQ Center?  Lockdown Policy?  See the pattern?

Just whom do they think they’re really protecting with these idiotic policies?
The justification for this new ban is absurd.  Apparently condoms on doors now fall under the University policy against “grossly obscene or grossly offensive” material and as such violate the “communal nature” of the Residence Halls.  According to Vice President for Student Affairs Juan Gonzalez, the “giving away of questionable items” is not permitted because “students need to feel as though this is their home and each person will respect all persons privacy and privileges.”

IS HE KIDDING?  This is a white envelope on someone’s door we’re talking about.  Grossly obscene?  Grossly offensive?  Even questionable?  I’d like to meet a single students who can say with a straight face that placement of such envelopes violates their “privacy and privileges” and they are “grossly offended” by them.  Please.

We all know what this is really about.  It’s about our Catholic identity rearing its ugly head again in the form of censorship and didactic imposition of “values.”  This university already refuses to provide easily accessible birth control, either from the on-campus pharmacy or bathroom condom dispensers common at campuses around the nation.  Now they’re refusing to let private individuals distribute condoms from their own place of residence.  What’s next – school sponsored lectures on the evils of actually using birth control??

Students will certainly continue to have sex regardless of whether condoms remain on doors.  Impeding H*yas for Choice in their quest for increased safe sex does nothing but harm the very students this university claims to be “protecting.”

Kennedy's Vietnam Dilemma

Georgetown University
International Relations
Fall 2002

Kennedy's Vietnam Dilemma

There is a key distinction between the reasons President Kennedy gave the nation (and the world) for his support of the coup d’etat against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his actual motivations.  To the world and the American public, Kennedy aided the overthrow of Diem because he felt a regime change would facilitate a victory against North Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh.   In reality, Kennedy’s decision was much more complicated.

Kennedy’s Dilemmas: Re-Election and Nuclear Annihilation

The pressures on Kennedy were serious.  Pragmatically, he cared about re-election  and the perception of his status as a powerful world leader in both the foreign and domestic press.  He was also concerned about the continued containment of communism, but more gravely, about maintaining a credible U.S. threat which would deter nuclear war.  His choice to support the coup can only be truly understood in the unique context of these pressures.

There was no question that his personal opportunism controlled his political choices, including the one he made to remove Diem — a leader whom he had previously supported — because the self-immolating Buddhists were generating negative U.S. press.  Kennedy was also guided in his decision by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as well as his team of advisors and diplomats.  The latter was generally divided into two camps: those that hated Diem — namely, Harriman, Ball, Forrestal, Hilsman, and Lodge — and those that understood and emphasized with him — that is, McCone, McNamara, Nolting, Colby, and Taylor.   Kennedy straddled the line between the two, directing a coup while at the same time remarking that the two leaders (Diem and Nhu) were not “just tyrants” but instead “in a difficult position … [and] they did the best they could for their country.”

Both President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk were deathly afraid of the plausible and terrifying threat of nuclear war.  The President was very aware that, if Berlin was invaded by the Soviets, Germany would depend upon the U.S. to escalate the war to a nuclear conflict, after which Europe and the U.S. would, in all probability, be annihilated.  Although Kennedy had personally and resolutely determined he would not use nuclear weapons, he felt a “desperate need to deflect the spark of war away from the tinderbox of European nuclear rivalry.”   The President thus became quite anxious about the credibility of the U.S. threat of mutually assured destruction, as he knew it to be a bluff.  Although now it is difficult to fully comprehend the “imminent and apocalyptic risks attendant on any NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Europe,” at that time, one thought retained primacy in Kennedy’s personal convictions: “a nuclear war must never be fought.”  

Of course neither Rusk nor Kennedy could outright say that they were unwilling to launch nuclear weapons, for anything but a complete poker face would spell disaster for the tense international showdown between the Soviet Union and the U.S.’s perception of threat.   In order to avoid such a catastrophe, Rusk and Kennedy felt they had no choice other than to “talk tough, even recklessly, about their willingness to fight a nuclear war.”   This, they felt, might not be enough — as well as talking recklessly, they also believed they needed “to act recklessly elsewhere, in a less volatile arena of world politics.”

As a consequence, they elected to fight their battle in a microcosm, a model of the clash between the two nuclear powers — communist U.S.S.R. and democratic U.S. — to show off U.S. bravado, encouraging the Soviet Union to think twice before using force in Europe.  Vietnam was thus selected as the stage from which to convince our Soviet adversaries that the United States was tough, that the US would not back down, and that democracy would be the victor.

Kennedy’s Conscience

With that reasoning in mind, it becomes clear that “only desperation [stemming from this fear of nuclear war] could have driven two such cautious personalities as Kennedy and Rusk to commit U.S. prestige and resources to the cause of South Vietnamese independence under the fragile and anachronistic leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem.”   Given this, it seems Kennedy’s decision to become involved in Vietnam was actually an extremely scrupulous one, indeed “the work of [his] conscience.”

In personal accounts throughout his term in office, Kennedy repeatedly displayed “rigid resistance to risking the future of the world’s children … a quality that places [him] in the front ranks of conscientious statesmen in the nuclear era.”   His “moral sticking point [was] the unthinkability of launching nuclear war.”  This meshed well with Rusk’s “conscience, which was also the driving force behind the new strategy.”   Indeed, both felt that by shifting the cold war from Europe to southeast Asia, they had made the world a safer place.

However, this shift left Kennedy unable to grapple correctly with the inherent differences in the Vietnamese political arena and way of life; he simply “assumed that American standards were applicable to Vietnamese politics.”   Of course, they were not.  In his commendable quest to avert nuclear disaster, Kennedy had stumbled into “the folly of seeking to superimpose the image of Washington on the reality of Saigon”—an impossibility with which his successors would unsuccessfully contend.

Kennedy, and the entire country, seemed to believe that American ethics were identical to the ethical values the world held as a whole.  Kissinger refers to this fallacy as America’s “belief in the universal appeal of its values.”  Consumed with our own moral correctness, along with an unremitting zeal to “improve” our allies, the US has a propensity to steamroll over foreign states’ right to autonomy.  The US so wishes to “advance peace and world friendship” with an idealistic and self-centered notion that American style democracy is the panacea for all nations’ problems.  Such ‘idealism’ is by nature the enemy of other peoples’ dreams and ideals.

Although the US consciously avoided uttering the trigger word “colonial,” due to its associations with past immorality, and perhaps fancying itself a neutral “ally,” they were only deceiving themselves, as they treated Vietnam in an identical way to the French colonial power that had ruled them previously.  This problem is once again at the forefront of American politics and foreign relations, as the world becomes increasingly resentful of President Bush’s attitude of U.S. unilateral decision-making.  The decades old policies of our country — we do what we want, when we want — have become increasingly inappropriate.

However much Kennedy may have made the decision to enter Vietnam conscientiously (as far as avoiding nuclear war was concerned), it remains that he did not seem to be troubled by the gloomy future of the country post-Diem.   In fact, he had been duly warned that “the most likely consequence of the coup would be military and political chaos in the midst of a highly unpredictable civil war.”   It was well known that there were no great leaders among the Vietnamese, but Kennedy did not seem to mind and nonetheless approved the coup on August 29, 1963.

It is only fair to acknowledge Jonathan Schell’s argument in Kennedy’s defense.  Schell contends that the havoc wrecked in a nuclear war is so extreme, that in comparison, almost anything seems morally acceptable.  Thus, Kennedy’s ability to realistically evaluate the consequences of entering into the conflict in Vietnam were markedly reduced.

The Lessons of Vietnam

It is clear that the “fundamental lesson of Vietnam is political and moral rather than strategic or journalistic.”  First, we must beware “the peril of presidential ambition.”   This may not be unique to Vietnam (indeed, it could be occurring presently in the war on Iraq), but it is yet another example of the lesson to be learned that politics and opportunism often go hand-in-hand.   We must be aware that careless, reckless, and sometimes cavalier decisions can be made by politicians solely for the purpose of achieving the positive reception of their elective public.

Second, we must avoid “the distortion of political judgment generated by American frustration at the intransigence of its irreformable allies.”  This, a “latent xenophobia masquerading as benevolence,” is our “tragic flaw.”   We must learn to accept that different ways of living may be right for different people.   Another lesson is one against hypocrisy.  How could the U.S. crusade for the self-determination of a state which we treated as a colonial power?  By creating policy around a double standard we set ourselves up for failure.  In fact, “from the moment that the United States committed itself to securing the independence of a wholly controlled ally, it had entered on its perilous march of folly.”

It is the previous sentence which suggests the most important lesson — that of respect for the sovereignty  of independent nations.  Certainly the conflict in Vietnam was a true test of natural law theory and the tug of war between the fundamental human rights of life and independence.  Some might argue that Kennedy’s decision to enter the Vietnam conflict staved off a third world war, saving lives at the expense of Vietnam’s independence.  But it is unlikely that such a victory needed to be achieved through such a blatant and belligerent rejection of Vietnamese sovereignty, and certainly not through a colonial-power type of counterinsurgency against the legitimate government of an independent nation-state.

Still, the Americans had the power to do it, and so they did.  Reinhold Niebuhr, the American theologian, argued that only through a balance of power can there be peace and respect of the right to independence.  Otherwise, “when power is unevenly distributed, the powerful are tempted to throw their weight around inordinately and disregard things like sovereignty or the self-determination of others; they trust too much in their own strength.”   The right of all nations to sovereignty,  or “constraint on the coercion of smaller nations by the powerful” was empirically upheld by the U.S. in dealings with European powers, but generally “ignored” in relations with the developing world.  The disproportionate power wielded by Americans decreased the likelihood that they would feel compelled to treat smaller, developing nations as independent, autonomous nation-sates.

Indeed, “American moral superiority calls for control of far-flung peoples in order to civilize them.”   We saw Vietnam as a tabula rasa — a blank slate upon which we could write the formula — our formula — for Western democratic success.  With the US political judgment clouded by self-righteousness, we vastly underestimated the obstacles to democratization of a society historically shaped by Confucianism.

No doubt our conscious resistance to respect the sovereignty of the South Vietnamese people and Diem’s regime contributed a great deal to the perception of our involvement there as a “debacle” or complete catastrophe.  Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, referred to Vietnam as the last time we had entered into a conflict unilaterally and without consultation with either our allies, including the country we were fighting for, and “that didn’t go so well.”  The lesson?  Collaboration and respectful diplomacy work.  Unilateral aggression does not.

The Vietnamese Lessons of Vietnam

Even my sense of the lessons of Vietnam is filtered through the lens of Americanism.  We should be vigilant about the decisions of our President, for they may be corrupted by desire for power.  We should also be careful not to treat independent nations as our colonies.  We must not attempt to impose our American democracy as the sole correct way of life for all peoples on earth.  We must be aware of the American veterans  who fought in the tragic conflict, but we also must be aware of the devastation wrecked upon a country which we often treated as a parent might a child.  What about the Vietnamese people?

The disintegration of  Vietnam’s national sovereignty and “gradual alienation of their nation’s independence” dealt quite a blow to quarter century old sovereign state of South Vietnam.   After the U.S. orchestrated coup, the eight successor governments to Ngo Dinh Diem destroyed what was left of the state’s national sovereignty, “each seeking nothing but the generous patronage of Vietnam’s latest foreign ‘partner.’”  It was similar to their relationship with their prior parent country, France, except in that instance, at least they had been honest about their colonialism and dependency.  The U.S., on the other hand, seemed unaware that it was inappropriate to treat Vietnam as their colony.  Although we may have had every right to try and persuade the S. Vietnamese to do our bidding, we had no right to infringe upon their government.

Thanh and Duc write with a subtle irony about the treatment of favored Nguyen Khanh, the general who came to power during the Johnson administration.  Henry Cabot Lodge used abundant praise when referring to Khanh, calling him “intelligent, unruffled and quickly comprehending … far above Diem and Nhu.”  That such praise was “similar to [that] given by the French governor general to the Vietnamese serving well the French colonial regime” is telling.  In rallies during March of 1964, Thanh and Duc describe Khanh’s appearance as one of “a mere puppet serving U.S. policy.”   This appearance most likely reflected the truth; it boded ill that the situation in South Vietnam had substantially worsened since the overthrow of Diem.  Khanh “was eager to do what Americans wanted and told him, and what he thought they also wanted but had not yet suggested him [sic].”  Of course Lodge was overjoyed to be of assistance, allowing Khanh to seek his advice for “all matters of state … [like] a docile and diligent student.”

Incredibly enough, it seemed that Khanh “on his own, was offering the sovereign rights of the nation to the U.S.  The loss of independence started with the American violations of Vietnamese national sovereignty during the Diem regime and accelerated after the November 1963 coup was complete by Nguyen Khanh who was now serving the Americans as he had done with the French.”  Summed up in that one sentence is the entirety of the collapse of the last tenuous hold the Vietnamese had on their independence.

Thanh and Duc use their piercing gaze to elucidate the sardonic reality of the situation, remarking on Lodge’s “self-congratulatory” statement that “I doubt if anywhere in the world the United States has a better relationship with a chief of state than exists here”  by mockingly answering that apparently no other chief of state wishes to hand over the sovereign rights of his or her nation to the U.S.  That fabulous relationship was headed for the rocks when the political situation got messy.  “There was no more law and order but chaos and unrest … Khanh showed he had no political abilities.”   Then, the new ambassador, Maxwell Taylor, upset by a Khanh action, upbraided the chief of state and told him to resign.  “the state of affairs in the country was just not only chaotic but anarchical.”  Certainly the North Vietnamese communists benefited from the disorder, in spite of the steadily escalating troop numbers put forth by the Johnson administration.

It seems clear that the Vietnamese right to self-determination and autonomy was being violated by the Americans — the very people who profess to honor such values above all else.  “The colonist intervention of the Kennedy administration deprived the Vietnamese who didn’t wish to live under a communist rule the opportunity to fight for themselves as a sovereign state.”   Thanh and Duc conclude poignantly that Diem was a patriot for his country, a nationalist who, ironically enough, never would have let the Americans enter into their doomed and costly war with Ho Chi Minh.

Their final question “Shouldn’t the American people give him official recognition and express regrets for his overthrow and assassination caused by the Kennedy administration?” elicits shame for all those who look at Vietnam and see only the American casualties and American suffering.  In essence Thanh and Duc are saying: “You entered our country, you tried to tell us what to do, when our leader refused to do your bidding, you had him assassinated and entered a long, costly and bloody war which neither our, nor your nation, seemed to want.”

Can the lesson we ought to learn be any more obvious?

Works Cited

Hoang Ngoc Thanh and Than Thi Nhan Duc.  Why the Vietnam War? President Ngo Dinh Diem and the U.S. His Overthrow and Assassination. Vietnam: Mai-Nam Publishers, 2001.

Malotky, Dan. “Niebuhr and U.S. Restraint.”  Sightings. University of Chicago Divinity School, Chicago, IL. October 31, 2002.

Winters, Francis X.  The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam. University of Georgia Press, Athens and London:1997.